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Small law firms in small countries with a big appetite - how AI and platform might change small firms?


{ dr. Homoki Péter / 23.02.14 }

Presentation at Pázmány Péter Catholic University, Faculty of Law and Political Sciences (Law and Language Research Group)

(Transcript of a short presentation, see the PDF of the presentation with tables and pictures here

Today, I would like to give you a presentation on how artificial intelligence and platform power (algorithmic-based control in the society) may change the future of lawyers.

Many of the issues discussed today are based on the deliverables of a project called AI4Lawyers 1, in which I’ve participated between 2020 and 2022, and which was done by the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe and the European Lawyers Foundation, and funded by European Union as well.

Why do I focus on small law firms? Because as you can see in the statistical data, in continental Europe at least, the dominant form of providing legal services is by way of small law firms. Small firms are usually defined as those with less than 50 employees, but in our case, we have used a stricter definition, the definition of entities with less then 10 employees.

It’s not surprising that when you classify by size the number of firms of all the firms providing a service in a sector, the overwhelming majority of such firms will be small firms (98% in the EU). However, in terms of legal services, this dominance remain true even when taking into account such economic indicators as the total number of employees working in the given class of entities, or even the share of turnover of such small firms compared to the total revenue of all the entities. Except in special cases, like that of the United Kingdom, more characteristically, the country of England and Wales, where even though 86% of all law firms (legal service providers) are small firms, they take up only a mere 15% of the total income of the sector, or less than 13% of the total employees of the sector. In the UK, this market works structurally differently from that of the EU, while the US is somewhere between the UK and the EU.

In practice, what does it entail that law firms are typically small? First of all, they have a flat organisational structure, a maximum of two or three levels of hierarchy (that of partners and other fee earners, that of administrative staff). With such a simplified structure comes simple workflows, with very little details and a minimum need for documentation if any of such processes. Such entities have minimum working capital, and law firms in almost all jurisdictions are barred from access to external financing (no external investors, while of course, debt financing is possible but very rare). At this size category, they have no professional management, the partners have to deal with such matters themselves, even if they are the only fee earners.

The selling point of a law firm is the experience, skills and social connections of partners, but while developing many of these skills is a mandatory deontological rule in many countries, they also take up valuable time and eat at the tight profitability of the firm. The main resource that is sold at such firms is the available time of the fee earners, even if these hours are well leveraged by way of using junior fee earners, trainees, paralegals and assistants. Even if many clients prefer a fixed price or value based approach to the output of the legal work, it does not change the fact that the bottleneck and the most important resource is that of the fee earners, highly skilled invididuals with a finite amount of available hours.

Perhaps the lack of IT spending and long term development goals is also a consequence of such an inherent focus on profitability.

Even if the individual knowledge of each lawyer is a specific, one of a kind resource, the market of legal services is a very competitive one. While based on trust and tradition, clients may insist on specific lawyers or law firms, small law firms often claim to be able to replace each other based on flexibility, adaption and learning, depending on possible revenues.

We will see that the challenges faced by law firms are very similar to what other small firms face that also rely on legacy businesses and that do not tend to spend a lot of resources on the development of its processes and its infrastructure.

Even if they are very similar to other small businesses, there are clearly also challenges that are specific to law firms. The legal services market is a very fragmented market, at least from the viewpoint of the European Union. It is fragmented across the languages used in the given territory, but also based on jurisdiction (e.g. Germany and Austria have the same official languages, but their legal systems are very dissimilar). The English language is not a primary work language for most of the law firms in the EU. While NLP and AI tools have to rely on economies of scale and expect such economies of scale from a commercial point view, law firms are not able to provide such uniformity, not only because the law itself is different from country to country (despite the efforts of harmonisation since 1950), because their rules of operations are very different across local jurisdictions and deontology rules.

While there are certain solutions to alleviate these problems regarding the language, such as cross-language transfer learning tools (transfering machine knowledge or annotated corpora from a resource-rich language to a resource-poor target language), there is hardly any such possibility for cross-jurisdictional issues.

Let’s take a look at an example of what it means not using the English language for certain AI purposes. WuDao, a Chinese large language model currently leading the leaderboard of the number of parameter size, was trained on 1.2 TB of Chinese and the same amount of English text. Or GPT-3 was trained on 570 GB of filtered text, 90% of which was English. Just for comparison, the largest corpus of the Hungarian language as of this date is 7.5 GB, and the Hungarian Wikipedia takes up about 1 GB compared to the 20 GBs of English.

But this should not mean that legal specific applications have to rely on large language models as we currently know it (e.g. on GPT-3). Having models and carrying out trainings for legal specific applications are not just simply about finetuning some “foundational model”. First, there would probably not be enough legal specific data (legal texts) to train these large models solely on legal documents, but more it would also not make any commercial sense (e.g. one run of GPT-3 training costs around 5 million €). Large language models, like autoregressive transformers should not be seen by lawyers as a generic AI that will always be the starting point for solving a legal specific task. Legal AI/NLP applications have to be designed from the ground up with the specific tasks in mind to be solved efficiently. Whereas in certain tasks, it could make sense to finetune a specific popular language model (e.g. BERT for a language understanding problem or for a specific branch of law in a given jurisdiction), in other uses, even the concept of finetuning a language models could mean vastly different processes that are hardly comparable (e.g. in GPT-3 “finetuning”).

Furthermore, the main strength of language models trained on a sufficiently large dataset is that they also inadvertently capture such hidden layers of meaning that we sometimes call as “common sense”, there is no such agreed cross-jurisdictional common sense in law. Clearly, there are important similarities in the legal concepts of jurisdictions that base some parts of their legal system on the hisorical reception of Roman law. Also, it does not take one to be a professor of comparative law to see the stronger similarities in the civil law of, say Hungary and Croatia, compared to that of Hungary and Finland. However, the probability of such serendipitous discoveries that result in practical advantages seems quite low.

Let’s take a look at these legal applications of AI and NLP that are relevant for law firms. In the AI Index 2022 Annual Report by Stanford University2, we can see that for this sector, the major areas in focus for AI applications is natural language processing (NLP, including understanding and generation) and robotic process automation.

We can already see that some law firms use document generation tools, and AI-powered legal research is very much commonplace (if for nothing else, then because the dominant search engines rely on such technologies since years by now), and also, document analysis in areas such as due diligence is also pretty advanced in terms of functionalities and choice. However, the major advantage for small law firms using such tools is not the huge output that can be generated by NLP, the number of documents such systems can spew out in a short time, but the quality of services such systems can afford to their users. With such tools, small law firms are able to compete with larger law firms, and can provide services cheaper, but at a comparable quality. Document automation is advantageous for small law firms not because they can generate such documents faster - due to the time needed for authoring and updating the templates, that may not be the case, using such tools may indeed take more time than to change a template whenever there is a need for that. But use of such tools can ensure consistencies in the services provided by small law firms that can differentiate them from other small law firms who rely only on ad hoc methods, non documented processes. So for small firms, legal automation is not necessarily about the speed of delivery (while that is also true e.g. in research tasks), but about the assurance of quality.

That’s also where small law firms have a particular disadvantage due to their simple processes. As long as the workflows and the operation of small law firms may not rely on data already recorded in a digital system, it makes it impossible to automate certain important workflows, thus making tools such as robotic process automation useless for this segment. We have seen that in the EU, there are considerable differences between national markets as to how widespread the use of practice or case management software is, which should usually serve as the major point of interface between the lawyers and the IT systems they are using. 3. Without small law firms using similar workflows and software in a country, it is increasingly difficult to integrate such law firms into the nervous system of a digital society.

This is where the possible future for the transformation of law firms becomes important. Being mostly small firms themselves, law firms have to adapt the way they work to integrate with their clients, whether they are consumers in a residential market, small business or large enterprises. All categories of clients will have their own specific needs and lawyers will all have to adapt to their requirements. Lacking IT skills, law firms will have to do this by way of different intermediaries.

As of now, there is no way to tell who these intermediaries will be, and probably there will be different intermediaries from country to country. They may be independent platform providers specific to a certain category of law firms (providing referral systems, legal databases or practice management software), they may be state owned enterprises implementing government policies, they may be arms of the the largest “super” platforms that have a practical monopoly of access to clients, or they may even be proactive bar associations investing huge amounts of money in risky IT projects to ensure the future independence of their members.

With regard to these possible intermediares, the most important question for lawyers are the following:

a) How effficient will these intermediaries be, and how much will they cost for the law firms?

b) How will they activities affect the independence of small law firms? Will these intermediaries be interested in keeping lawyers in the “sales loop” for the long term and to keep them in a strong position?

c) How independent these intermediaries themselves will be from larger platform providers?

As of now, it is not yet possible to answer these points of uncertainties, especially not for such a diverse economy as that of the EU.

  1. See https://www.ai4lawyers.eu 

  2. https://aiindex.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/2022-AI-Index-Report_Master.pdf 

  3. See the first deliverable of the AI4Lawyers project: Overview on the “average state of the art” IT capabilities of law firms in the European Union and gap analysis compared to US/UK/Canada best practices, at https://aiindex.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/2022-AI-Index-Report_Master.pdf 

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Expensive new clothes for intermediary service providers


{ dr. Péter Homoki / 23.01.26 }

Or what should Hungarian small businesses expect?

Published on ArsBoni!

Introduction

On 19 October 2022, the EU adopted the Digital Services Act (which we will refer to as DSA),1 further extending the scope of the regulation to cover the provision of certain online activities for certain online activities.

Companies will have to comply with it from 17 February 2024 on, and this will be a directly applicable regulation, with no mandatory domestic transposition or any domestic legislation necessarily taking place. The new regulation will affect the activities of many internet service providers, including those who provide their services only to non-consumers. It is therefore worth explaining the new requirements of this Regulation.

The Regulation itself contains a number of rules that are specific to size, and in this article we will only discuss those requirements that also apply to small businesses. This article will not only focus on the new rules of the Digital Services Act. Inevitably, we will also show how the rules differ from those of the P2B (platform-to-business) Regulation (P2B Regulation), which has been applicable for two and a half years, as there is a large overlap in content between these two regulators.

In the spirit of EU competitiveness, the family of rules governing the activities of small businesses has therefore been extended to include a new member, adding to the existing plethora of rules on data protection, warranties and electronic contracting, consumer protection, commercial, taxation, copyright and IT security supervision.

(As a reminder, small enterprises in EU law2 are defined as enterprises with fewer than 50 employees according to the accounts and either an annual balance sheet total or an annual net turnover of less than €10 million – not including the complicated parts due to non-independent enterprises.)3

Who are these intermediary service providers?

The term “intermediary service provider” was defined in the E-Commerce Directive4 (quite independently of the concept of the intermediary under Hungarian civil law). The main purpose of the definition was to support the objectives of the E-Commerce Directive, and not to create a doctrinally appropriate concept. One of the main objectives of the Directive was to address the “clouds” gathering over the then infant Internet commerce in line with the international regulatory practice of the time. The tool was a horizontal exemption mechanism for the whole of the EU (then the European Community) for the various Internet service providers. The Directive in this context was essentially a version of the US federal Communications Decency Act and Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), adapted for the European Community.

The use of the term intermediary in the Directive consists of building on a very broad concept of information society service (ISS) to define three further very broad categories of services (Articles 12-14). If a service provider provides a service that qualifies as such, i.e. is an intermediary service provider, the directive/regulation will in fact significantly reduce its legal risks, not only at national level but also at EU level.

Information society services themselves cover essentially all online services that are currently available in this area (see Directive 98/34/EC). Nevertheless, twenty-five years ago, it was important to conceptually separate internet/online type services provided electronically at a distance and at the individual request of a recipient from the similar services of the time, such as sales from physical vending machines and mail order sales of data carriers, telecommunications and broadcasting services, financial services and even lawyer services provided by a telephone5.

This concept of ISS was originally supplemented by three additional sub-types (mere conduit, caching and hosting), and all three types covered a very wide range of Internet services, with a scope growing over time, both at the technical level and among business end-users.

By way of example, it is worth listing the market services that the legislator has clearly classified under each legal category in the DSA6 and in its preparation7:

(a) “mere conduit”: includes internet access providers for end-customers and (wholesale) internet transit services, internet exchanges, wifi access point providers, VPN providers, domain name (DNS) servers (since the DSA), top-level domain registries and registrars, and even certificate authorities;8

b) “caching”: caching proxy servers, content delivery network (CDN) services;

(c) “hosting”: web hosting, media sharing platforms (photo, music, video, blog), file sharing applications, cloud infrastructure and platform services (IaaS, PaaS); social networks (including e.g. TikTok) and discussion forums, online marketplaces (eBay, Craigslist), multi-user online games (Xbox Live, WoW), search engines, rating systems.

In Hungary, it was already clear from 2001 that search providers were also considered as intermediary service providers,9 while at the EU level this was clarified by a Luxembourg court decision.10 Subsequently, in 2016 and 2020, the term ‘intermediary service provider’ was further extended to include application service providers and video sharing platform service providers. Now, only the term ‘application service provider’ is outside the EU extended EU terminology of ‘intermediary service provider’.

New definition of online platform providers

The European Union has also introduced a new term from 16 November 2022, a new type of intermediary service provider being an “online platform” (Article 3): “a hosting service which, at the request of the recipient of the service, stores and publicly disseminates information …”, giving as an example “social networks or online platforms enabling consumers to conclude contracts with traders at a distance”. The online platform was already a hosting sub-type of intermediary service provider, but the DSA will impose significant new obligations on this category.

It should be remembered that, in the case of the online platform, the service itself is the storage and dissemination of information at the request of each user. So, if an online service provider makes available e.g. illustrations itself (which illustrations are not collected from the users), this is not a hosting service and not an online platform service, because the essence of its service here is to make available its own service, not to store and distribute information at the request of a user. If the same service provider collects these illustrations from its users and makes them available, it will be an online platform service provider (even if it will effectively have several different types of user categories, e.g. a sub-site for illustrators and a sub-site for downloaders).

Not included in the definition, but an essential element of online platforms is that they facilitate interaction between two independent users, i.e. there are at least two layers of service: the platform service always has another layer of interaction built on top of it – whether it is that as a social network, users (consumers) engage in non-profit communication with each other through the information they post on the platform (distribute), or whether it is that these platform users are enabled to provide business services to additional end-users, e.g. operating online marketplaces. For colleagues seeking a more in-depth understanding of the topic, I would also recommend reading Zsolt Ződi’s thorough historical analysis.11

It should also be emphasised that the concept of online platform in the Regulation can be interpreted too broadly, basically hosting services can be included in this conceptual scope, where there is no reason to apply rules arising from the specific characteristics of the platform. This should be understood as cloud services that aim to provide a specific platform or infrastructure to end-users. This is also referred to in recital 13 of the Regulation: ‘… cloud services and web hosting services that function as infrastructure, such as the underlying infrastructure hosting of an Internet-based application, website or online platform, should not be considered as services that publicly distribute information stored or processed at the request of a user.

About the rules that apply to all small business intermediary service providers

The E-Commerce Directive imposed very few obligations on intermediary service providers. Basically, under the liability rules, it only said what these entities should do if they became aware of infringing information in the case of caching and hosting providers12, and these liability rules were changed only minimally (see below), and the lack of a general monitoring obligation as a main rule was maintained.

The two simple obligations of the E-Commerce Directive (the general obligation to provide information and the specific rules on commercial communications) remain unchanged for intermediary service providers (but the Directive does not require compliance by intermediary service providers, but by all providers of information society services).

However, the conditions under which online service providers are obliged to deal with unlawful content have been significantly extended. For all intermediary service providers, there is now a clear expectation that they must comply urgently with requests from other Member States, even from courts or authorities, through national coordinators, with regards to blocking or reporting.

This in itself will tie up considerable resources for service providers – including if they wish to check whether the authority is entitled to access the requested data or to request blocking.

The general obligations of the E-Commerce Directive on provision of data will be extended by requiring intermediary service providers to maintain and publish a separate contact point for public authorities and another one for users. In addition, it is not sufficient to designate a contact point that is only an automated device, such as a chatbot13.

The fact that the DSA has also set its own requirements regarding the content of their terms and conditions in order to protect users is expected to significantly disrupt the operations of most intermediary service providers. The new requirements relate in general to the disclosure of information about restrictions on use (including possible moderation, automated decision making and complaint handling), but also include an obligation to notify users of unilateral changes. We will see in the next section that even more detailed obligations apply to business platforms.

Obligations of hosting providers

Even the smallest hosting providers will be subject to a number of new obligations.

The first set of obligations will detail the procedure for dealing with content that is suspected to be infringing, how to report it and how to make the investigation process more transparent. As the obligation to receive notifications will apply to a large number of service providers, and as the Regulation sets out detailed technical conditions, it is expected that in practice a standardised notification interface and service will be developed, similar to the cookie acceptance mechanisms.

As part of ensuring transparency, hosting providers will have to explicitly indicate if the processing of notifications is automated in any way – i.e. this is not only an obligation for automated decision making, but also information on any form of automated processing. However, the Regulation does not set a specific deadline for the processing of notifications.

Also to ensure the protection of users and the transparency of service providers’ decisions, the Regulation imposes a requirement to give reasoned notice (information) to users on the restriction of certain uses.17 The rules on the justification are described in relative detail in the Regulation, hoping to limit the narrow-mindedness of service providers’ decisions, which may be sensitive to users.

Finally, the Regulation imposes a reporting obligation on hosting providers in the event that they have information that suggests that someone has committed a “crime that threatens the life or safety of a person.”14

It can be seen that if an intermediary service provider wishes to comply with all of these obligations, it will incur non-negligible costs – even though the EU impact assessment found this to be a negligible cost.15

Obligations of online platform providers

For small businesses, the range of obligations specifically applicable to online platform will be minimal, as most of the provisions are exempted by the DSA.16

Thus, for online platforms, the bulk of the obligations are the same as those applicable to hosting providers, with two additional additions.

One addition relates to the category of online marketplaces within the scope of online platform providers: a provider cannot be exempted under the intermediary exemption if it appeared to an average consumer that the order in question was fulfilled by the marketplace itself or by an operator controlled by it.17 Online platform providers are generally interested in reshaping the balance of power between their different categories of users to their own advantage. For example, if a customer in a local service market is satisfied with the service of a provider (e.g. a competent electrician). However, the platform that dominates access to that local service may not be interested in the customer calling that provider directly next time, even if only because of its share loss, and therefore the platform may design its service to minimize the relevance and identifiability of the actual provider to customers. It is this ‘disruptive’ tendency that this rule is intended to curb (albeit in the case of products rather than the services in the example).

The other addition is an obligation to provide data, where they will have to provide their six-month average number of users, according to a methodology to be defined in future legal acts, at the request of the Member State coordinator.

The “online intermediation service”: less known specific rules for B2B platforms

It is also important for our purposes to understand the little known “online intermediation service18 In practice, an online intermediation service will necessarily be an intermediary service as well (and also an online platform) under the DSA, but the definition of the term is not using the term intermediary. The reason is that this concept predates the Digital Services Act. For some strange purposes, the Commission has not sought to align the terminology of these two regulations, only referring in the draft DSA to the P2B Regulation as a “lex specialis”.

The concept of online intermediary services and the P2B Regulation were issued to allay fears about platforms designed for commercial “re-use”. Thus, only services aimed at business users are covered, where the “platform service” itself is intended to facilitate transactions between business users and consumers.19

Thus, the P2B Regulation does not cover platforms of a consumer nature (typically social networks, TikTok, etc.), whereas the DSA’s online platform term covers these consumer-to-consumer platforms as well.

The P2B Regulation, although narrower in scope than the Digital Services Act, contains more detailed and prescriptive rules. It is difficult to see how the Regulation applies in practice, even though it has been applicable since July 2020. In Italy, the competent authority has already published a guidance document following a public consultation,20 but in other countries (such as Hungary) it is not known which authority will act on any related issues. Only three out of 27 Member States have so far taken the trouble to designate an authority or organisation representing the interests of business users under the P2B Regulation. The Commission should also have sent its report to Parliament on the experience in applying the P2B Regulation more than a year ago – the draft report is already available, according to public procurement reports, but it is not yet public.

Let us briefly review how the obligations of the P2B Regulation differ from those of the DSA.

Compared to the DSA’s general obligations on contract terms, the P2B Regulation imposes more detailed obligations. In particular, it is not sufficient to inform users of (unilateral) changes to the terms and conditions, but it also sets a minimum time limit for the amendment. Apart from narrow exceptions, the time period for the amendment must allow the business users to adapt to the notified change (but not shorter than 15 days). The terms and conditions must also provide information on how the use of the platform affects the intellectual property rights of the business user and on the additional channels through which the platform provider will sell products also offered by its own user.

The conditions relating to the restriction of service are also much stricter. While under the DSA, only the general restriction conditions applicable to hosting providers are imposed on small business services (see point 5) and small businesses are exempted from the more detailed rules on the restriction of abusive uses21, under the P2B Regulation, small businesses do not benefit from such relief. They must provide in their contractual terms and conditions details on how they will deal with manifestly infringing content, notify their users of the restriction on a durable medium at the latest at the time of the restriction and allow their users to seek clarification by means of a complaint.22 Regardless of the suspension, the time limit for terminating the provision of the service must not be less than 30 days.

Both online search providers and online platform providers are obliged to publish an explanation of their ranking of users under the P2B Regulation,23 and small businesses are not exempt from this obligation (whereas they are exempt from this in the DSA).24

Finally, it is only under the P2B Regulation that small businesses are required to provide information to their users in their contractual terms and conditions on how they can access their data entered or generated in the course of providing services.25

Summary

Given that the P2B Regulation and the DSA Regulation will affect a significant number of service providers even at national level, it would be appropriate to intensify the dissemination of information on these two EU legal acts. The actual application of the P2B Regulation is still pending in many countries, including Hungary, despite the fact that the deadline for its application has been overdue for two and a half years. It is likely that those business users affected are not even aware that their rights in this area are not being respected, that the necessary information is not being published. Member States and authorities, with few exceptions, are not helping the situation.

As the date of 17 February 2024 approaches, it is increasingly likely that the impact of these two regulations will only become more widely known by users and service providers alike. However, the later small businesses start to prepare for these - not insignificantly costly - changes, the more expensive the cost of compliance will be and the less opportunity there will be to implement coordinated, cost-effective IT and legal solutions.

(Last updated 28 January 2023)

[^2] Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on promoting fairness and transparency for business users of online intermediation services (P2B Regulation), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/1150/oj.

  1. REGULATION (EU) No 2022/2065 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 19 October 2022 on the Single Market for Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065

  2. Commission Recommendation of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reco/2003/361/oj, for Hungary, see the definition as part of the Act XXXIV of 2004 on small and medium-sized enterprises, on the support for their development. 

  3. These exemptions under the DSA do not apply to medium-sized enterprises. 

  4. Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market. 

  5. See Annexes V to VI of Directive 98/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations (as amended by Directive 98/48/EC). 

  6. DSA (28)-(29) preambular paragraphs. 

  7. see SWD(2020) 348 final Commission Staff Working Document: Impact Assessment Report Accompanying the document PROPOSAL FOR A REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on a Single Market For Digital Services (Digital Services Act) and amending Directive 2000/31/EC, 15 December 2020, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:5ebd61c9-3f82-11eb-b27b-01aa75ed71a1.0001.02/DOC_2&format=PDF and Sebastian Felix Schwemer, Tobias Mahler and Håkon Styri, ‘Legal Analysis of the Intermediary Service Providers of Non-Hosting Nature’ (1 July 2020) https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3798494, accessed 21 January 2023. 

  8. DSA (recital 29) 

  9. Act CVIII of 2001, § 2(l). 

  10. Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 12 December 2006 in Joined Cases C-236/08 to C-238/08 Google France and Google v Vuitton, ECLI:EU:C:2010:159. 

  11. Zsolt Ződi, ‘Characteristics of the European Platform Regulation: Platform Law and User Protection’ (2022) 7 Public Governance, Administration and Finances Law Review, p. 91 https://folyoirat.ludovika.hu/index.php/pgaf/article/view/6319, accessed 17 January 2023. 

  12. articles 13(1)(e), 14(1) and (2), 15. 

  13. recital (43) and Article 12(1). 

  14. Article 18 

  15. SWD(2018) 138 final COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on promoting fairness and transparency for business users of online intermediation services, point 6.2, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52018SC0138

  16. articles 19\ and 29. 

  17. Article 6(3). 

  18. The term used in the P2B Regulation is "online intermediation service", whereas the term used in the E-Commerce Directive and the DSA is intermedi[ary]{.ul} service. The first is an online intermediary service provider, the second an intermediary service provider – although all intermediary service providers are necessarily online under the Electronic Commerce Directive and the DSA, and the P2B Regulation bases its definition of online intermediation service on the ITOS, not on the term "intermediary service" in the Electronic Commerce Directive. 

  19. ibid., Article 2, point 2. 

  20. E.g. for airbnb, booking, Shopify we found such provisions following from the P2B regulation, but not for e.g. eBay and Amazon online store. 

  21. DSA Article 23 

  22. Article 4 of the P2B Regulation 

  23. See on this the Commission Communication: Guidelines on ranking transparency pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 of the European Parliament and of the Council, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/HU/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52020XC1208(01) 

  24. Article 5 of Regulation P2B and Article 27 of DSA 

  25. P2B Regulation Article 9 

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Lawyers and their robotic assistants


{ dr. Homoki Péter / 22.12.13 }

How and for what purposes lawyers use conversational agents?

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