CHAPTER 1: Courts should have a leading role in anonymisation to enhance transparency in proceedings and decision-making ensuring openness and accessibility
Introduction
Anonymisation is important for courts to properly implement, but it is difficult to perform and is fraught with legal controversies (see CHAPTER 4, CHAPTER 5).
It is important for courts to play an active role in anonymisation in the following four roles: (1) to promote the use of anonymisation as widely as possible, enabling greater transparency, (2) in regulating anonymisation, (3) in making individual decisions in relation to anonymising certain documents, and (4) in more general, retaining professional control over any access provided over court data.
More specifically in relation to role no (1), courts should support inexpensive access to different kinds of court documents (including judgements, transcripts, hearing schedules), recordings, court metadata and knowledge representation data, statistics etc. Considering that the most significant court data involves large amounts of personal data, anonymisation is a central tool in reconciliating data privacy rights with the objectives of public hearing and public pronouncement of judgements is anonymisation (see CHAPTER 2).
This participation of courts in anonymisation should therefore be as direct and clearly regulated as possible. Anonymisation is not a one-off process that is completed before publication, but a continuous process (see CHAPTER 3) with different risks at specific times.
Courts have to take it into account that any possible involvement of intermediaries (such as publishers or other media companies) may have a negative effect on the public function of courts, and also that intermediaries have no right to take important decisions on behalf of courts, limiting future room for manoeuvre of courts in anonymisation.
In relation to role (2) and (3), principle CHAPTER 2-CHAPTER 3 sets out further details.
The European e-Justice Strategy 2024-2028 also emphasizes the strategic objective of promoting data-oriented justice, providing that opening up justice while taking data protection rules into account will foster transparency. Anonymisation is a key tool in attaining this objective and the strategy also specifically mentions anonymisation as a technology improving efficiency in the justice domain.
Explanation
It is difficult to give a widely accepted definition of “anonymisation”, considering the constantly changing technical means and the wavering practice of the different European data protection authorities.
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) defines anonymous information as information “which does not relate to an identified or identifiable natural person” or “personal data rendered anonymous in such a manner that the data subject is not or no longer identifiable” (Preamble (26))
In some cases, anonymisation is merely a measure to enhance the protection of personal data, while in others, anonymisation is intended to be a final solution to avoid the applicability of a personal data protection regime (such as the General Data Protection Regulation). But data protection authorities take this second meaning of anonymisation more strictly, and in the case of published court decisions, it is not practically possible to achieve this level of anonymisation.
With regard to the digitalisation of civil justice systems in Europe, the main use of anonymisation is about ensuring the transparency of the procedure and the privacy of the affected parties at the same time.
Public hearing and public pronouncement of the judgements are included in separate sentences of Article 6.1 of the Convention, and thus, the case law of the ECtHR differentiates between the right to a public hearing and the public delivery of judgements (such as in the case of Straume v. Latvia, Nikolova and Vandova v. Bulgaria), and the requirement of being “pronounced publicly” is also understood to cover accessing a particular case file or registry (Ryakib Biryukov v Russia).
However, from the viewpoint of anonymisation, there is an organic link between these two principles.
References
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) 2016 (OJ L 119, 4/5/2016)
ECtHR: European Convention on Human Rights
Straume v Latvia [2022] ECtHR 59402/14 §§ 127–132.
Nikolova and Vandova v Bulgaria [2013] ECtHR 20688/04 §§ 64–86
Ryakib Biryukov v Russia [2008] ECtHR 14810/02 §§ 19–25.
Cécile Chainais, ‘Open Justice and the Principle of Public Access to Hearings in the Age of Information Technology: Theoretical Perspectives and Comparative Law’, Open Justice (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co KG 2019) pp. 64–65 https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/10.5771/9783845297620/open-justice accessed 27 August 2023.
Council of the European Union, European e-Justice Strategy 2024-2028, C/2025/437, OJ C, 16.1.2025, http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/437/oj accessed 20 June 2026
CHAPTER 2: Rules of anonymisation must be transparent and practical
Introduction
There is no legal or policy framework on the publication of national court decisions at the EU, and obviously this results in the lack of EU-level guidance on anonymisation as well. Also, in countries with such a framework in place at the national level, often this same framework contains guidelines on anonymisation as well (if there is any such regulation).
Regardless of the existence of any explicit national frameworks, court decisions are still almost always anonymised, with the notable exception of common law countries, where decisions are anonymised by default only in specific cases, such as in family cases or when they concern minors, or otherwise if the anonymisation is granted by the judge on request of the persons affected.
Considerable diversity in practice is present with regards to both the technique and the content, i.e. what is considered as personal data that should be anonymised and how that anonymisation is carried out.
Although most of the detailed rules and process should be defined at national level or below (e.g. by courts), certain principles (such as the transparency of anonymisation rules or the conditions in principle CHAPTER 3) and technical standards of anonymisation tools defined at the EU level could provide practical assistance.
Standards or technical best practices could assist in addressing the most generic practical problems, such as a minimum level of anonymisation (what information to anonymise in all cases), more detailed technical processes such as replacement of original terms with randomised terms while preserving some context (e.g., selecting replacement terms from a set of terms with similar semantic content), European benchmarks of natural language processing tools for anonymisation.
This way, national administrations and courts could retain certain freedom of choice in anonymisation while detailed data protection impact assessment could support an EU-wide, common anonymisation toolset.
Explanation
In Raza v Bulgaria, the ECtHR said that “there exist techniques which can accommodate legitimate security concerns without fully negating fundamental procedural guarantees such as the publicity of judicial decision.” However, whether such techniques exist in practice, is not easy to answer.
Although anonymisation is as a very important data processing operation, there is hardly any guidance to courts how that should be carried out. Even the 2014 opinion of the Article 29 Working Party on anonymisation techniques did not intend to provide more than a summary of the technical difficulties and on the impossibility of “final” anonymisation, instead of being a practical interpretation of the term under data protection law – the opinion was not intended as a guideline, but more a warning about the dangers of reidentification.
One can hardly underestimate the risks of inappropriate anonymisation if we consider the repeated use of the same techniques in hundreds of thousands of decisions. Many of these decisions contain sensitive information that made it necessary for citizens to turn to courts for resolving their disputes. Also, a considerable part of court documents (e.g., judgements and court decisions) that are made public will be accessible for everyone without a limitation in time and in the purpose of reuse, and courts might not retain any control over such documents any longer (see also CHAPTER 3). Any case law published will be copied by a number of publishers or private parties, which may make it impossible to withdraw or further anonymise an already published court case.
Taking all these into account, new techniques in anonymisations are likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons affected by the court documents. In such cases, article 35 of the GDPR requires that data controllers carry out data protection impact assessments prior to the use of processing. But so far, there is not even a comprehensive list of relevant techniques at the level of the EU, let alone any common elements in their impact assessment.
As for the actual techniques of anonymisation, literature differentiates between partially-preserving and non-preserving techniques, or at a more practical level, complete obscuration (by replacing the original with blackening the data), shortening names to initials or replacement by fake data or role. There is a clear trade-off between the two approaches: partially preserving techniques, such as shortening names to initials retains important relations of the original data, but increases the success of reidentification attacks. At the same time, non-preserving techniques make it more difficult to understand the applicable facts of the individual case, the possible common links between the published case and the current case being subject to the proceedings, and it makes it more difficult for any legal professionals to remember to legal reasoning behind a specific case.
The Court of Justice of the European Union has recently started experimenting with an interesting technique that tries to find a middle ground between preserving links and minimising reidentification risks: anonymised cases involving natural persons are allocated a fictitious randomised name. Experiments could also be conducted to verify the effects of replacing case facts beyond direct identifiers that also have the potential to identify a particular person. But this approach of replacing common or proper names from a circle of terms with semantically similar meanings could also have its own disadvantages, including misleading readers, generalising beyond the original intent of the judges, or even adversely affect an individual happening to have the same name as the fictitious one (even if this is no longer a question of data protection).
A large number of tools are available for automated anonymisation, including solutions relying on named-entity recognizers and other machine learning based natural language processing techniques. The increasing demand for automation of this task and the costs of fully manual anonymisation lead to more and more resources being devoted to the field of automation in anonymisation for every language. Anonymisation has become one of the key focus areas of the European e-Justice Strategy 2024-2028 (Promote an innovative digital justice, Leverage of innovative technologies). This increased attention on the technical aspects of anonymisation also increases the usefulness of supporting areas, such as the development of widely accepted anonymisation benchmarks or even mandates for standardisation bodies for some parts of these processes.
Common standards or best practices built from the technical side that also take into account data protection aspects could definitely facilitate the risks of national courts in complying with the rights of data subjects under data protection law.
Regardless of advances in the automatic anonymisation, the requirement of manual (human) review and verification probably cannot be fully eliminated, and even technical rules brought at the level of the European Union cannot substitute transparent national rules on anonymisation, based on which courts bring their own decisions. Considering the difference between common law and civil law courts in terms of the objectives of anonymisation, any policy or framework on anonymisation should probably be left to remain at the national level to preserve the court’s discretion in choosing the actual tools used.
References
Council of the European Union, European e-Justice Strategy 2024-2028, C/2025/437, OJ C, 16.1.2025, http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/437/oj accessed 20 June 2026
Opijnen M van and others, ‘On-Line Publication of Court Decisions in the EU: Report of the Policy Group of the Project Building on the European Case Law Identifier’ [2017] SSRN Electronic Journal https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=3088495 accessed 29 June 2022
Raza v Bulgaria [2010] ECtHR 31465/08 § 53
CHAPTER 3: Complete and final anonymisation of court documents is unattainable
Introduction
Based on the current rules of data protection, it is not possible to finally and completely anonymise a specific court document. One can easily remove direct identifiers of persons mentioned in a given document, but that will not remove all personal data. Court documents mainly relate to persons, so most court documents are full of so-called indirect personal data as well.
In many court documents, it is either technically impossible or legally undesirable to achieve anonymisation in the sense of avoiding the applicability of a personal data protection regime (see also principle CHAPTER 4).
Anonymisation can only be understood as a tool to enhance a given state of protection of personal data.
That also means that the risk of (re)identification of the affected natural persons will normally remain present, even if just for a restricted set of third parties, and also that the effective tools of anonymisation depend not only on the content of the document, but on factors external to the document, that only court officials can take into account.
For that purpose, policy frameworks for anonymisation of courts should take into account factors listed in the principle.
Current rules of data protection also mandate courts to allow the exercise of the right to erasure of personal data. However, courts should also be mindful of the significant risks of such retroactive anonymisation of court documents (and recordings, etc.), including the lack of control over previously anonymised and published documents, so retroactive anonymisation should only be allowed in exceptional cases. The aim should be a generally accepted degree of anonymity, considering at least a) the type of document being anonymised, the content of and data included in the document, b) the type of court and court procedure, c) participation of the affected persons in the procedure, d) the control courts will retain over the anonymised documents
Explanation
While removing direct identifiers in the court decisions is a feasible objective that is currently attempted by all courts that publish decisions, this will not make the decision anonymous under the GDPR or the Article 29 Working Party Opinion 05/2014 on Anonymisation Technique. Similar to the wide definition of personal data under GDPR, the Article 29 Working Party opinion expressly mentions that anonymisation should also provide protection against linkability or simple inference, which could also include specific facts of the case (see also principle CHAPTER 4). They have also highlighted that due to the evolution of technical means, “it is neither possible nor useful to provide an exhaustive enumeration of circumstances when identification is no longer possible.”
Several research has also shown that final anonymisation of decisions, even according to a strict reasonableness standard of a “minimal effort”, could practically be impossible.
In the absence of other objective support, the tools of anonymisation used have to depend on both the content of the document and factors external to the document.
The court policy on anonymisation should include at least principles in relation to the degree of anonymity to be achieved, and the application of such principles should depend on, among others, the categories of documents involved in the anonymisation, the categories of direct identifiers (whether including or not company names not considered as personal data), other personal data such as addresses or locations, acceptable levels of aggregations (that can already be considered as depersonalization).
Also, the level of anonymisation should depend on external factors that are also taken into account in the policy on publication of court documents, such as the typical role of the court within the judiciary (fact finding or ensuring uniform application of the law), the number of decisions a particular category of court has to anonymise, the types of civil proceedings takes place etc.
Taking into account the findings of the ECtHR in the Vicent case, the participation of the affected person in the proceedings ending with the decision does also have relevance in terms of any rights of requesting anonymisation following publication. More generally, technical possibility or absence of the same by courts to exercise control over the published decision should also be taken into account the most appropriate technique and degree of anonymisation.
The right of data subjects to be forgotten, as first defined by the Court of Justice of the EU in the Google Spain case, and later confirmed by the GDPR itself, opened up a new front not only for media archives, but also for the retroactive anonymisation of judicial decisions. As noted by the ECtHR “name searches have become commonplace in today’s society, and more often than not people conduct such searches for reasons wholly unconnected to any prosecution or conviction of the person concerned.”
There is clearly a possibility for people to request retroactive anonymisation from courts. However, the Court of Justice already had an applicant who requested the retroactive (“ex post”) anonymisation of prior cases containing his name, which request was refused at both instances, with the reasoning that “the applicant had no absolute right justifying derogation from the general principle that judicial decisions are to be published”, and mentioned that, as a principle, anonymisation must be weighed against the various reasons justifying publicity.
Courts deciding on whether to grant such ex-post anonymisation requests, have to take into account multiple factors. The most important risk is that if an increased ratio of published court decisions will be of an ephemeral nature (they are public only until one of the participants take the trouble to exercise their right of erasure), this will also affect any future case law relying on that particular ex-post anonymised decision. Another factor is that if, for compliance reasons, courts will have to treat anonymised decisions as documents containing personal data, courts will also be liable for a number of other obligations of GDPR, and will have to enforce requirements of the GDPR vis-a-vis the recipients of anonymised decisions. Courts will have to identify such recipients (e.g., publishers) and will have to inform such recipients of any right to erasure, include processing details in their own records of processing activities, etc. Responsible courts will not be able to simply make case law available to everyone, such requests to data will have certain costs that will have to be covered, etc.
References
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 4/2007 on the Concept of Personal Data’ (2007) WP 136, 01248/07/EN https://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2007/wp136_en.pdf
CJ v Court of Justice of the European Union [2019] Court of Justice of the European Union T-1/19.
CJ v Court of Justice of the European Union [2020] Court of Justice of the European Union (Seventh Chamber) C-634/19 P.
Deuber D, Keuchen M and Christin N, ‘Assessing Anonymity Techniques Employed in German Court Decisions: A {De-Anonymization} Experiment’ (2023) https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity23/presentation/deuber accessed 22 August 2023
European Court of Human Rights: Rules of Court Practice Directions p. 68, Requests for anonymity, <<https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr/PD_anonymity_ENG>> accessed 28 Januyr 2024
Google Spain SL, Google Inc v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González [2014] Court of Justice of the European Union C-131/12.
Hurbain v Belgium [2023] ECtHR [GC] 57292/16
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) 2016 (OJ L 119, 4/5/2016)
Vicent Del Campo v. Spain [2019] ECtHR 25527/13 § 32.
CHAPTER 4: Anonymisation must not endanger the objectives of public hearing and public pronouncement of judgements – risks of over-anonymisation should also be taken into account
Introduction
Anonymisation has an important effect on the ability of published case law to fulfil its inherent role, supporting transparency and openness.
Anonymisation – and privacy in general – has a negative effect on the relevancy and applicability of the case law to future similar cases. Anonymisation can lead to court decisions that are more difficult to understand, and the relevancy with similar cases will be more difficult to identify (e.g., due to the reduced number of facts in the statement of facts).
The negative effects of anonymisation (on the usefulness and transparency of published judicial decisions) can be apparent when courts anonymise quasi-identifiers that just qualify as indirect personal data, capable of being used for linking or inference, such as the locations, occupations, specific acts and circumstances, etc. Even if direct personal identifiers are removed, these further details can still support the narrative of a given case (and thus, future case law), can provide a familiarity for the readers to relate to. Facts in court decisions even provide symbolic anchor for memorisation. Even anonymisation by replacing original facts with randomised facts (such as real names with fictitious names) could inadvertently affect future legal practice and reinforce existing prejudices.
Recently, both courts of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights have taken steps to increase the degree of anonymisation, which results in the increasing risk of over-anonymisation.
Therefore, beyond replacement or erasure of direct identifiers of natural persons such as names, all anonymisation should be evaluated in terms of how it will affect the understandability and public acceptance of the court's action.
Explanation
Removing direct identifiers in the court decisions is a feasible objective that is currently attempted by all courts publishing decisions, but this will not make the decision anonymous under the GDPR or the Article 29 Working Party Opinion 05/2014 on Anonymisation Technique.
While the flexibility of the definitions of personal data and anonymisation is warranted as long as the aim is to protect the rights of individuals, this is a considerable risk for those performing the data processing activity, including anonymising and publishing decisions. Similar to the wide definition of personal data under GDPR, the Article 29 Working Party opinion expressly mentions that anonymisation should also provide protection against linkability or simple inference, even against hardly noticeable facts in a decision that are only recognizable for a handful of persons. This could include a set of facts that rarely occur together, such as specific destinations of travel by a group, a limited number of persons having a somewhat less common disease at the same time in a small region, a well-publicised process of separate events, etc.
Also, in considering the degree of necessary anonymisation, courts will also have to take into account that a considerable part of court documents (e.g., judgements and court decisions) made public will be accessible for everyone without a limitation in time and in the purpose of reuse, and courts will probably not retain control over such documents (see also CHAPTER 3): case law published will be copied by a number of publishers or private parties, where it is no longer possible to withdraw or further anonymise an already published court case. This also means that the methods reasonably likely to be used for reidentification (such as singling out to identify the natural person directly or indirectly, GDPR preamble (26)) will be almost unlimited, because the decision will be available for anyone for any purposes without any limitation in time. So when anonymising decisions, courts should prepare for unlawful reidentification attempts as well, and cannot rely on having a specific knowledge of what kind of data these unknown third parties will have access to.
The expected trend that more and more information about natural persons become accessible either publicly or to some categories of unknown third parties, also points to the risks of least noticeable attributes in a court decision leading to identification of a specific person.
Necessarily, even the current state of the art in anonymisation will be seen in time as insufficient, which leads to an understandable over eagerness of courts to anonymise as much facts as possible in court decisions.
However, studies clearly show that decreasing the risks of linkability will probably destroy most of the information in the statement of facts, up to a point which questions the whole point of making a decision public. Removing these quasi-identifiers
It is also expected that an increased ratio of published court decisions will be public only until one of the natural person participants decide to exercise their right of erasure, such a tendency could have a yet unknown effect on the transparency of courts.
References
Opijnen M van and others, ‘On-Line Publication of Court Decisions in the EU: Report of the Policy Group of the Project Building on the European Case Law Identifier’ [2017] SSRN Electronic Journal https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=3088495 accessed 29 June 2022
Jean-Claude Wiwinius, ‘Public Hearings in Civil Proceedings: From the Perspective of a Luxembourgish Judge’, Open Justice, vol 13 (1st edn, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co KG 2019) p. 101 https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/10.5771/9783845297620/open-justice accessed 27 August 2023. See also Michal Bobek, ‘Epilogue: Past and Looming Challenges to Open Justice’, Open Justice, ibid p. 292–301.
Deuber D, Keuchen M and Christin N, ‘Assessing Anonymity Techniques Employed in German Court Decisions: A {De-Anonymization} Experiment’ (2023) https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity23/presentation/deuber accessed 22 August 2023
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 05/2014 on Anonymisation Techniques’ (2014) WP 216, 0829/14/EN pp. 11–12 https://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2014/wp216_en.pdf.
Emily M Weitzenboeck and others, ‘The GDPR and Unstructured Data: Is Anonymization Possible?’ (2022) p. 12 International Data Privacy Law 184 https://doi.org/10.1093/idpl/ipac008 accessed 30 August 2023.
CHAPTER 5: Anonymisation of court hearings, recordings and decisions should be based on the same framework, but providing access to such information should take into account the differences
Introduction
The operation principle of data-driven justice of the European e-Justice Strategy 2024-2028 also encourages „access to open justice data”, aiming to „increase the level of transparency of justice systems. Taking into account that the e-Justice Strategy considers judicial data as a key working area of the e-Justice domain for this period, it’s not sufficient if the regulatory framework to anonymisation covers only judicial decisions and minutes or transcripts of hearings, but should also cover all such judicial data where personal data is involved, clearly covering court recordings, broadcastings and media archives.
From a purely technical perspective, there should be no difference in publicity during the hearing, the public delivery of a judgement and the accessibility of the same information after delivery – the obligation to make such information available to the widest possible audience, as part of open justice.
Similarly, once a hearing (or the recordings of a hearing) is publicly broadcasted and accessible, transcription of such hearings would not, in technical terms, make new personal data publicly available.
The policy of anonymisation should be mindful of the fact that once a hearings is publicly accessible, it requires minimum technical effort to make copies of the full hearings and have all those hearings transcribed (even with some inherent transcription errors). Currently, there are no effective technical measures on the courts’ side to retain any control over such court hearings, similarly to court decisions made public.
Thus, the data protection concerns of public hearings made accessible via the internet and judgements made public are very similar.
That also means that if a court decision need to be anonymised, at least the same degree of anonymisation should apply to recordings made accessible for the same public, but anonymisation of live court hearings and court recordings will require a lot more resources than anonymisation of court decisions.
If this kind of resource is not available, then, from a data protection point of view, the court hearings should simply not be broadcasted (streamed) and the recordings should not be made publicly accessible.
However, even if it is true from a technical perspective that there is not much difference between publicity during the hearing and accessibility to a court decision following delivery, this should not be interpreted in a way that an obligation of courts to make their judgements public, should also make all court hearings and recordings public as well. Recordings as court provided contents will necessarily contain a lot more personal data than judgements, including briefs of parties, testimonies etc., that are currently, in most European countries not public at all. Furthermore, courts may have less control over such judicial content, including less resources for effective anonymisation.
In summary, while court rules and policies on anonymisation should also cover court data other than decisions and case law, that should not be interpreted in a way the obliges courts to make such available court data available, even considering the strategic objective of promoting data-oriented justice.
Explanation
Once transparency in a wide technical sense is strictly enforced, it becomes a very easy technical task for interested third parties (like publishers or even private persons) to transcribe the recordings into written form and reuse this new, vast amount of information for indexing, for information retrieval, for machine learning purposes including evaluation of judges, lawyers, courts, parties to the proceedings, etc.
This approach of a perceived generic “right of access to court information” without necessarily being a party, is becoming an increasingly prominent form of the transparency of courts, of open justice – a rule that requires courts to conduct their proceedings in public. This information-centric, open justice requirement could also be seen as a court-specific branch of the even wider “right of access to State-held information”.
Open justice is also not an end to itself, and there will always be boundaries that have to be respected. Besides the right to data protection of natural persons affected as a strict boundary, academics have also called the attention to the risks of turning, via the openness of justice, court proceedings into advertising for commercial or private activities or using it as a mean to attack the impartiality of the judges.
We also have to be mindful of the considerable difference between the original meanings of publicity of hearing. Publicity was limited to the public physically present in the room, or to journalists who were allowed to attend hearings, or publicity as having the possibility to personally visit courthouses to read court materials on file. This publicity is clearly not the same as hearings accessible for anyone on the world wide web, without any costs for accessing materials, processing files and making copies, or the obligation of the court to provide non-discriminatory access to their entire dataset for further analysis.
Such practical costs and difficulties justify different treatment of the publicity, and require different protection measures.
References
Burkhard Hess and Ana Koprivica Harvey (eds), Open Justice: The Role of Courts in a Democratic Society (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft Mbh & Co 2019) § 9. https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/10.5771/9783845297620/open-justice accessed 27 August 2023
Cécile Chainais, ‘Open Justice and the Principle of Public Access to Hearings in the Age of Information Technology: Theoretical Perspectives and Comparative Law’, ibid, pp. 64–65.
Council of the European Union, European e-Justice Strategy 2024-2028, C/2025/437, OJ C, 16.1.2025, http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/437/oj accessed 20 June 2026
Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v Hungary [2016] ECtHR [GC] 18030/11.
Directive (EU) 2019/1024 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on open data and the re-use of public sector information, Articles 5-12.
